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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 18/05/2006 Accident number: 279 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 31/07/1991 
Where it occurred: not made available Country: Kuwait 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: KMOD 20/SER 7 Name of source: Various/AVS 2001:K3 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: VS50 AP blast Ground condition: sandy 
Date record created: 19/02/2004 Date  last modified: 19/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mechanical follow-up (?) 
 
Accident report 
The details of Kuwait Boards of Inquiry are considered ‘Commercial in Confidence”. The 
following summary is gathered from various documentary and anecdotal evidence made 
available during the research. All anecdotal evidence is drawn from sources who were in 
Kuwait at the time of the accident. 
The victim arrived in Kuwait on 10th June 1991, so had only been working there for six weeks 
at the time of the accident. 
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The victim was a flail operator using a JSFU AARDVARK. At the time to change operators, 
the victim walked from the cab in a flailed area, walking in the flail’s tracks. [The “cab” is at the 
rear of the machine.]  
The “informal SOP” at the time allowed operators not to drive the machine out of the mined 
area at changeover times.  In this case, the victim tried to change from one track to the other 
as his replacement operator and his Team Leader approached. As he changed tracks, he 
stood on the ground between the tracks and trod on a VS50 AP mine. The VS50 is over-
pressure protected (a sustained pressure is needed) and so “resistant” to detonation by flails.  
At the time, it was not known whether the flails were 100% effective but the operators and 
managers were apparently confident of their abilities. Trials were carried out later and they 
confirmed that the flail did not clear 100% of the VS50 mines. The Aardvark flail (as 
configured then) was little used after this accident. 
Following the accident the Team Leader was dismissed, but later employed again as a 
replacement for the victim. 
The JSFU Aardvark units were later modified to have a greater rotor speed which was 
believed to make them more effective. The actual effectiveness of this was apparently not 
satisfactorily demonstrated to the field operatives. 
  
Victim Report 
Victim number: 354 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: driver  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Various Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Management/control inadequacy” because 
the SOPs that allowed the victim to walk in areas presumed clear after the passage of the flail 
were based on the unfounded belief that live mines were not left in its wake. It was known at 
the time that the flails were not 100% effective – especially in sand and when facing over-
pressure resistant mines.  The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because 
the machine was not suitable to be used in the manner that it was deployed. 
SOPs were reported to have later changed to reflect the fact that flailed areas should not be 
considered safe, and that a second method of clearance should be employed after the flail.  
That its effectiveness had not been objectively assessed prior to deploying the machine as a 
primary clearance tool was a significant management failing. 
The fact that the Field Supervisor was dismissed and then hired again to take the victim’s 
place adds weight to the view that it was not inadequate field supervision that caused the 
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accident, but the apparently cavalier attitude of a management pressed for time and eager to 
make maximum use of machines. 
There is a paucity of reliable data for many of the accidents that occurred in Kuwait. If any 
reader has additional detail, please send it for inclusion.   
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